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JUSTICES STEWART AND CLARK: SWING VOTES ON
THE WARREN COURT
INTRODUCTION
Because the Supreme Court is subject to the views of nine
Justices it is likely to be divided on many issues. The Court
experienced a particularly divisive period in the late 1950's,
when Earl Warren was Chief Justice.' A liberal four-vote bloc
composed of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas
and Brennan' generally opposed a three-vote bloc composed of
Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker.' Justices Clark
and Stewart held the middle position between these blocs and
were often key swing votes.' This being the case, an analysis of
their judicial ideas and values, as expressed in their opinions
and voting patterns, is important to understanding this period
in the Supreme Court's history.
This comment examines the voting records of Justices
Stewart and Clark during the October Terms of 1958, 1959, and
1960. Their voting records are surveyed in five types of cases:
subversion, criminal law and procedure, labor, business regula-
tion, and tax. The cases in these categories constitute at least
half of the decisions handed down by the Court in each term.
The effect of Stewart's and Clark's votes on the outcome of the
cases in each category is explored. Because bloc voting was
prevalent during this period, it is instructive to discover which
Justice was the swing vote in each area.
JUSTICE STEWART
Subversion
During the 1958, 1959, and 1960 Terms, the Supreme
Court faced many major issues relating to subversive activi-
ties.5 These issues ranged from the power of legislative commit-
tees to investigate citizens' to the propriety of denying social
© 1979 by Steven Smith.
1. Galloway, The Second Period of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend Abates
(1957-1961), 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 947 (1979).
2. Id. at 974.
3. Id. at 973-74.
4. Id. at 976.
5. The 25 subversion cases are listed in app. A, table 1 infra.
6. E.g., Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Wilkinson v. United
States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960); Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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security benefits to aliens because of their communist beliefs.7
Two statistically significant points emerge from these deci-
sions. First, fifteen of the twenty-five subversion cases litigated
during the period were decided by five-four votes with the lib-
eral bloc supporting the individual's claim and the conserva-
tive bloc aligning itself with the national security position. Jus-
tice Stewart voted with the conservative bloc in thirteen of
these cases. Although Stewart voted with both blocs of the
divided Court in the subversion cases, he voted with the liberal
bloc only in rare circumstances. The second significant feature
of the subversion cases is that the individual prevailed only
when the government position was clearly untenable to a deci-
sive majority of the Court. Of the ten decisions where the indi-
vidual prevailed, only one was decided by a vote closer than
eight-one.8 When the issue was not so clear, Justice Stewart
almost always voted with the conservatives in support of the
government.
Justice Stewart wrote five majority opinions in the subver-
sion area-an unusually large number.' His opinions were crisp
and concise and perhaps earned him the task of writing a large
portion of opinions in an area where the Court may have been
particularly sensitive to the need for very clear statements of
its views. Wilkinson v. United States'" is an example of Justice
Stewart's concise writing and his general view in the subversion
area. There, the Court sustained Wilkinson's conviction for
refusing to answer questions by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities. Stewart, relying on Barenblatt v. United
States," reaffirmed the principle that associations of private
individuals are not exempt from congressional investigations
on first amendment grounds. He stated unequivocally that "it
is the nature of the Communist activity involved . . . that
establishes the Government's overbalancing interest."'2
While Justice Stewart believed that some investigation
into the private lives of citizens was necessary, he recognized
7. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
8. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959)(5-4 decision).
9. Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365
U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960).
10. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
11. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
12. 365 U.S. at 414. See generally Justice Stewart's votes in Slagle v. Ohio, 366
U.S. 259 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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the need for restraints. In Shelton v. Tucker, ' 3 Justice Stewart
joined the liberal bloc and demonstrated his reluctance to allow
unlimited prying into the private affairs of citizens. The statute
examined in Shelton granted investigative power to hiring au-
thorities in the Arkansas public school system. The statute
required that teachers file affidavits stating their associational
ties before they were rehired for the new year. Stewart, writing
for the Court, held that the statute was too broad in its grant
of unlimited investigative authority and thus violated the
teachers' rights of associational freedom protected from state
interference by the due process clause. Stewart recognized as
worthwhile the state's interest in investigating the competence
of its public school teachers, but invalidated the procedure by
which the state furthered its goals. 4
Criminal Law and Procedure
During the 1958, 1959, and 1960 Terms, the Supreme
Court heard more cases involving criminal law and procedure
than any other issue." Not surprisingly, the great bulk of
cases concerned the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments. The
government prevailed in twenty-six of the sixty cases (forty-
three percent). Individual Justices voted in the following
manner:
TABLE 1
Justice Defendant State
Douglas 55 5
Black 54 6
Warren 50 9
Brennan 46 14
Stewart 28 29
Whittaker 27 33
Harlan 25 35
Frankfurter 21 38
Clark 19 41
Table 1 indicates almost even support by Justice Stewart
for individual and government claims; Stewart also occupies
13. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
14. Id. at 490. See also Justice Stewart's opinion in Deutch v. United States, 367
U.S. 456 (1961).
15. The 60 criminal cases are listed in app. A, table 2 infra.
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the middle position in the table of disagreement rates for crimi-
nal cases.'" Furthermore, Justice Stewart voted with the liberal
bloc only in clear cases; thirteen of his twenty-eight votes cast
for a defendant came in unanimous decisions. However, in this
area, he more clearly deserves his label as the swing vote. Bloc
voting was prevalent; fourteen cases were decided by five-four
votes. Unlike his record in the subversion area, Stewart split
his criminal case votes between the liberals and conservatives
rather evenly, supporting the individual's claim six times" and
the government's position eight times."I
The substantive values and ideas exhibited by Justice
Stewart in criminal cases are difficult to discern. As the above
statistics indicate, Justice Stewart occupied a middle position
in these cases. He adhered neither to the absolutist position of
Justice Black on the Bill of Rights," nor to Justice Frank-
furter's position of judicial restraint and deference to the legis-
lature. Stewart was generally willing to uphold the defendant's
claim when it involved a denial of due process, 0 but he sup-
ported the government's position on most other criminal is-
sues." Thus, as in the subversion area, Justice Stewart sup-
ported the individual's claims only in limited areas and cir-
cumstances.
Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinions in Cash v.
Culver"2 and Hudson v. North Carolina13 that reversed state
court convictions on due process and right to counsel grounds.
In Cash, the defendant was convicted of burglary largely on the
16. See app. B, table 2 infra.
17. Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961); Milanovichv. United States, 365
U.S. 551 (1961); Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Heflin v. United States,
358 U.S. 415 (1959).
18. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Green v. United States, 365 U.S.
301 (1961); Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960); Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217 (1960); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959);
Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
19. See Dilliard, The Individual and the Bill of Absolute Rights, in Huno BLACK
AND THE SUPREME CoURT 97 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
20. Justice Stewart voted to find due process violations in a number of cases,
including: Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S.
633 (1959).
21. See notes 22-31 and accompanying text infra.
22. 358 U.S. 633 (1959).
23. 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
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basis of the testimony of an accomplice. The defendant pro-
ceeded without counsel, failing to cross-examine the accompl-
ice. The Court held that under these circumstances, due pro-
cess mandated the assistance of counsel. In Hudson, defen-
dant's attorney withdrew after a co-defendant pleaded guilty.
Because Hudson did not request a mistrial or precautionary
jury instructions, the Court concluded that he did not under-
stand the possible prejudicial effect of the guilty plea and his
conviction violated due process. In both cases, Justice Stewart
believed that, under the circumstances, a fair trial without
counsel was impossible.
Justice Stewart did not believe in an unlimited right to
counsel, however, and occasionally would not embrace exten-
tions of this right advocated by the liberal bloc. In Anonymous
v. Baker,24 Stewart joined the conservatives in denying defen-
dant's right-to-counsel claim in an administrative proceeding
inquiring into allegedly improper practices by attorneys. In
addition, Justice Stewart would not extend the right to counsel
to the point preceding the beginning of formal judicial proceed-
ings, as his later dissenting votes in Escobedo v. Illinois"5 and
Miranda v. Arizona"8 indicated.
In the search and seizure area, Justice Stewart also ad-
hered to a more limited view of individual freedom than his
liberal colleagues. In Elkins v. United States,"7 he wrote the
majority opinion invalidating the use in federal courts of evi-
dence illegally obtained by state officers. While rendering a
decision favorable to civil liberties, Justice Stewart was careful
to point out that the Court was not "unaware of the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforce-
ment. '2 8 Justice Stewart did not view Elkins as imposing any
new burdens on law enforcement interests since the exclusion-
ary rule already applied to federal officers in federal courts and
the decision did not invalidate work done by state officials in
state courts. The following year, Justice Stewart failed to join
that portion of the majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio" making
the exclusionary rule applicable to the states.
Stewart's view on warrantless searches can be gleaned
24. 360 U.S. 287 (1959).
25. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
26. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
28. Id. at 222.
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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from two important five-four decisions. In Frank v. Maryland,3 ,'
a search of private property by city health officials conducted
without a warrant, was upheld because: 1) the search was very
limited in scope; 2) the search was not arbitrary or carried out
in a disagreeable fashion; and, 3) the purpose of the search was
not to obtain criminal evidence. In Abel v. United States," a
search by Immigration and Naturalization officials pursuant to
an administrative warrant was upheld because the defendant's
arrest was legal and the search met the requirements for a
search incident to a lawful arrest. In either case, Justice Stew-
art could have agreed with the liberals and insisted that judi-
cial warrants be obtained. Instead, he was satisfied with the
fact that the searches complied with the spirit and policies
served by the fourth amendment.
Labor
The labor cases generally involved interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act or the
Fair Labor Standards Act. In these cases, an economic liberal
could be expected to support labor unions in controversies in-
volving union members or the National Labor Relations Board.
The Supreme Court during the 1958-1960 period generally ad-
hered to this liberal position, voting twenty-three of thirty-five
cases in favor of labor unions.3"
In examining the voting records of the individual Justices,
noted in Table 2 below, varying degrees of support for the union
position are apparent.
TABLE 2
Pro-Union Anti-Union No Participation
Douglas 31 4 -
Black 28 4 3
Warren 28 6 1
Brennan 27 8 -
Harlan 22 12 1
Clark 18 17 -
Frankfurter 17 14 5
Stewart 16 16 3
Whittaker 14 21 -
30. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
31. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
32. The 35 labor cases are listed in app. A. table 3 infra.
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It is apparent that Justices Warren, Black, Douglas and Bren-
nan generally voted pro-union. But another bloc, composed of
Justices Frankfurter, Clark, and Stewart, divided their votes
almost equally for and against the union position. It is difficult
to discern a concrete position for Justice Stewart. NLRB v.
Fant Milling Co.33 is an example of his sometimes pro-union
voting behavior. s In Fant, Justice Stewart allowed an NLRB
complaint against an employer to stand, broadly construing
the power granted to that body. The court of appeals had re-
fused to enforce a Board order because the order took cogniz-
ance of events occurring subsequent to the filing of the com-
plaint. Justice Stewart wrote:
To confine the Board in its inquiry and in the framing of
the complaint to the specific matters alleged in the charge
would reduce the statutory machinery to a vehicle for the
vindication of private rights.u
There were other cases, however, where Justice Stewart
agreed to interpret labor statutes in an anti-union manner.36 In
DeVeau v. Brainsted,3 Stewart joined a majority opinion that
upheld a New York State Waterfront Commission Act that
effectively prohibited convicted felons from becoming union
officers. The majority did so in spite of a NLRB provision that
allowed union members to elect whomever they wanted. The
majority reasoned that because Congress approved the com-
pact between New York and New Jersey creating the ,Commis-
sion, with full knowledge of the NLRB language, the Commis-
sion's Act had congressional approval.
Business Regulation
The Supreme Court decided a number of cases having to
do with government regulation of business in each of the Terms
during the period.3 The cases often involved either congres-
33. 360 U.S. 301 (1959).
34. See generally Justice Stewart's votes in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB,
365 U.S. 667 (1961); Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
35. 360 U.S. at 307.
36. See generally Justice Stewart's votes in Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union
v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961); Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528 (1960); Mitchell v. Zachry, 362 U.S. 310 (1960); Union Pacific
R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959); Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S.
207 (1959).
37. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
38. The 46 business regulation cases are listed in app. A, table 4 infra.
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sional grants of regulatory authority to administrative agencies
or federal statutes directly regulating economic affairs. Two
significant features regarding the Court's resolution of these
cases can be discerned. First, the Court supported federal regu-
lation of business in thirty-nine of the forty-six cases. Table 3
indicates the relative support of governmental business regula-
tion by individual Justices.
TABLE 3
Votes in Favor of Business Regulation
Total Cases 46
Warren 39
Brennan 39
Black 38
Clark 37
Douglas 36
Stewart 28
Whittaker 25
Harlan 24
Frankfurter 23
Moreover, the Court often voted in discernible blocs. In
the twelve cases of bloc voting, the liberals opted for broad
regulatory authority. But Justice Stewart normally agreed with
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter that very clear authority from
Congress was needed to uphold the regulation in issue."
Justice Stewart wrote only one opinion in the forty-six
cases, so his position on these issues must be gleaned from the
opinions he joined. Typical of the position with which he
agreed was the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in United
States v. Republic Steel Corp.10 The majority in Republic Steel
construed the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, that precluded
the creation of "obstructions" in the navigable waters of the
United States, as prohibiting the dumping of industrial wastes
into the Calumet River in Illinois. Harlan's position was con-
cisely stated in his concluding paragraph:
39. See table of disagreement rates in app. B, table 4 infra.
40. 362 U.S. 482 (1960). See generally Justice Stewart's votes in Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961); FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960).
JUSTICES STEWART AND CLARK
What has happened here is clear. In order to reach what it
considers a just result, the Court, in the name of
"charitably" construing the Act, has felt justified in read-
ing into the statute things that actually are not there.
However appealing the attempt to make this old piece of
legislation fit modern-day conditions may be, such a
course is not a permissible one for a court of law, whose
function it is to take a statute as it finds it. The filling of
deficiencies in the statute, so that the burdens of main-
taining the integrity of our great navigable rivers and har-
bors may be fairly allocated between those using them and
the Government, is a matter for Congress, not for this
Court. "
Justice Stewart also advocated a limited view of the au-
thority granted to administrative agencies. In Farmer's Educa-
tional & Cooperative Union v. WDA Y, Inc.,42 he joined in a
dissent from the majority decision that held the Federal Com-
munications Act barred broadcasting stations from censoring
material broadcast by a candidate for office. The majority up-
held a long-standing procedure of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) that granted immunity from libel actions
under state laws to those who obtained an FCC license. The
majority so ruled despite the fact that the Act itself did not
mention immunity from libel actions. The dissenters argued:
We have here not a course of administrative interpretation
of an ambiguous provision . . . . This is a ruling of consti-
tutional law-that the Supremacy Clause, Const. art. 6
requires that the existence of the Communications Act of'
1934 oust the States of jurisdiction to impose libel laws
upon broadcasts made under the provisions of [the stat-
ute]. Such constitutional rulings are for this Court and
not for administrative agencies."
In summary, Justice Stewart adopted a fairly traditional
conservative position in the business regulation cases. He advo-
cated limited judicial review of congressional enactments, tight
statutory construction and insisted on a clear delegation of
authority to support the actions of regulatory agencies. The
41. 362 U.S. at 510.
42. 360 U.S. 525 (1959). See Justice Stewart's votes in Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S.
464 (1959).
43. 360 U.S. at 537.
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Justice had very little sympathy for the liberal bloc's view of
broad governmental control over business.
Taxation
Most of the tax cases involved construction of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) as the government was imposing a tax on
individual or business taxpayers." Table 4 shows how the Jus-
tices voted in the tax cases:
TABLE 4
Votes Cast for the Government's Position in Tax Cases
Total Cases 27 Against Individuals Against Business
Clark 22 10 12
Frankfurter 21 9 12
Warren 21 10 11
Black 20 9 11
Brennan 20 8 12
Harlan 19 9 10
Whittaker 17 7 10
Stewart 16 5 11
Douglas 11 5 6
As the table indicates, a fairly cohesive bloc, including Warren,
Black, Frankfurter, Clark and Brennan, generally approved the
government's power to tax. Justice Stewart's position was sup-
portive of the taxpayer in these cases, but his views regarding
taxation were not always consistent.
In certain cases, Justice Stewart advocated a literal read-
ing of the statutory language. In American Automobile Asso-
ciation v. United States,45 the Court forced the taxpayer to
include prepayment of dues by its members in gross income for
the taxable year in which they were collected despite the fact
that much of the money was collected in advance of when
services were actually rendered. Justice Stewart argued in dis-
sent that the majority view: "ignore[d] the clear statutory
command that a taxpayer must be allowed to make his returns
in accord with his regularly employed method of accounting,
44. The 27 tax cases are listed in app. A, table 5 infra.
45. 367 U.S. 687 (1961). See Justice Stewart's votes in Flora v. United States,
362 U.S. 145 (1960); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304 (1960).
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so long as that method clearly reflects his income."4 On the
other hand, in Commissioner v. Acker, 7 Stewart joined the
majority, holding that the failure of a taxpayer to file a declara-
tion of estimated income tax should subject him to the single
penalty for that infraction only, and not to a second penalty for
filing an underestimate of tax-the statute specifically called
for the imposition of two penalties.
Justice Stewart's readings of IRC deduction provisions
were inconsistent. In Knetsch v. United States"5 the Court dis-
allowed a deduction based on interest paid on indebtedness.
The taxpayer purchased annuity savings bonds worth
$4,004,000 by paying $4,000 in cash and obtaining loans for the
balance. As the taxpayer paid the rather large interest on the
balance, he would recoup his interest payments by borrowing
against the value of the annuities. The borrowing also kept the
net cash value of the annuities, on which payments had to be
made, very low. The majority would not allow the interest de-
ductions because the taxpayer was making little progress in
paying off the annuities, while obtaining large interest deduc-
tions. Stewart joined Douglas in a broad interpretation of sta-
tutory deductions and argued in dissent that the taxpayer's
scheme should be allowed since "tax avoidance is the dominat-
ing motive behind scores of transactions." 9 However, in
Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 5 0 Stewart supported a narrow view
of deductions. The decision disallowed the travel-away-from-
home expense deductions of construction workers who were
away from home for continuous periods ranging from eight to
twenty months, by adopting a "temporary versus indefinite"
test of legitimate absence. The majority would not allow the
taxpayer to comply with the letter of the statute while abusing
its spirit.
There was no evidence of bloc voting in the tax cases.
Justice Stewart generally supported the taxpayer's claim, but
his analysis was not always consistent. He departed from his
pattern in the economic cases by advocating broad construc-
46. 367 U.S. at 699.
47. 361 U.S. 87 (1959).
48. 364 U.S. 361 (1960). See also Justice Stewart's vote in Massey Motors, Inc.
v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960).
49. 364 U.S. at 371.
50. 358 U.S. 59 (1958). See Justice Stewart's votes in Meyer v. United States,
364 U.S. 410 (1960); Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959); Camarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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tion of statutes and, on occasion, by failing to give weight to
statutory authority directly applicable.
JUSTICE CLARK
Criminal and Subversion
Justice Clark's position in the criminal and subversion
cases was conservative. In the criminal cases, Justice Clark
voted against the defendant more than any other Justice (forty-
one of the sixty cases decided by the Court).' Justice Clark
disagreed with two of the liberal Justices in more than sixty
percent of the cases.5" In addition, over half of Justice Clark's
pro-defendant votes were in cases where no more than one Jus-
tice dissented-cases where most of the Justices saw the issues
very clearly. Finally, Justice Clark was the lone dissenter twice,
arguing in favor of the state's position.53
Justice Clark's attitude toward subversive activities was
generally known before his appointment to the Court. As Presi-
dent Truman's Attorney General, Clark instituted a loyalty
program for federal employees,5" and the Justice Department
drafted the first list of dangerous political organizations.55 Jus-
tice Clark's conservative viewpoint continued into his years on
the Court. He vigorously supported the government's position
vis-A-vis the Smith Act,5" wider discretion for legislative inves-
tigations into private affairs of citizens" and the interest of
national security in cases involving passports, 8 deportation59
and loss of citizenship. 0 In these cases, Clark often wrote bit-
ter' and solitary dissents" criticizing any restriction on govern-
51. See Table 1, supra p. 1011.
52. See Table of Disagreement rates in app. B, table 2 infra.
53. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Ladner v. United States, 358
U.S. 169 (1958).
54. Kirkendall, Tom C. Clark, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969, at 2666 (L. Friedman and F. Israel eds. 1969).
55. Id.
56. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). The Smith Act made it a crime
to conspire to overthrow any government in the United States. See Alien Registration
Act of 1940, Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670.
57. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
58. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
59. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
60. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
61. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957).
62. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
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mental activity. Justice Clark disagreed with the four liberal
Justices in more than seventy percent of the subversion cases
during the 1958, 1959 and 1960 Terms. 3
While there was much evidence of bloc voting in these
cases, Justice Clark was anything but a swing vote. He occu-
pied the far right position in the areas of criminal law and
subversion during the period. The cases in these areas received
much publicity, probably contributing to Justice Clark's some-
what undeserved conservative label. An analysis of Clark's vot-
ing in the three economic areas provides a more balanced view
of the Justice.
Labor
Justice Clark's position in the labor cases was very similar
to that of Justice Stewart. Clark divided his votes equally be-
tween the pro- and anti-union positions. 4 The Court, however,
was pro-union in almost seventy percent of the labor cases. "
Unlike Justice Stewart, Justice Clark wrote very few opin-
ions in the labor cases. The opinions he joined utilized both
broad and strict statutory construction to support both sides of
the issue. For example, in Mitchell v. Zachary,6" the majority
(with Justice Clark joining) construed the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act to exclude from coverage workers engaged in con-
struction of a dam that would impound waters entirely within
the state of Texas. The majority reasoned that the dam was
neither a facility of "commerce" nor an instrument of "produc-
tion," and therefore not covered by the statute. 7 Justice
Douglas, in dissent, expressed concern that such a strict inter-
pretation would undermine the broad base that Congress had
given the Act. 8
Justice Clark, however, was willing to construe labor stat-
utes more broadly. In Fetter v. Southern Pacific Co.,"5 Justice
63. See table of disagreement rates for subversion cases in app. B, table 1 infra.
64. See Table 2, supra p. 1014.
65. Id.
66. 362 U.S. 310 (1960); see generally Justice Clark's vote in Int'l Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N.W.Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.
288 (1960); United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
67. 362 U.S. at 314-16.
68. Id. at 325.
69. 359 U.S. 326 (1958); see generally Justice Clark's votes in Local 357, Int'l
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Clark joined a six-three majority holding that an employee did
not have to use a form provided by the union to cancel his dues
check-off assignment. The Railway Labor Act merely said that
assignments to a labor organization were "revocable in writ-
ing." The Court reasoned that the added requirement of a
union form was unduly burdensome and that the Act did not
empower carriers and labor organizations to bargain for any
restrictions on an individual's right to revoke his assignment.
All things considered, Justice Clark was not a very firm
supporter of governmental control in labor cases; his stance
clearly departed from his positions in subversion and criminal
cases.
Business Regulation
Justice Clark and Justice Stewart had very different views
on issues involving government regulation of business. There
were many instances of bloc voting in this area. Justice Clark
repeatedly joined the liberal wing to uphold the power of regu-
latory agencies and to broadly construe statutes that regulated
various commercial practices.7 Stewart generally sided with
the conservative bloc, occasionally joining the liberal major-
ity.' On only one occasion, however, did Justice Clark vote
with his conservative colleagues.7"
An example of Justice Clark's generosity regarding the
scope of authority granted regulatory agencies can be found in
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. 3 The majority
held that the Commission should be able to consider public
policy when it denies certification to a pipeline company to
transport natural gas. The Commission denied the certificate
because the planned use of the gas was inefficient and because
the sale would tend to raise prices. Transcontinental argued
that the Commission did not have authority to consider these
policy questions. The Court replied, that even though there
Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); United Steelworkers of America v.
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
70. See Table 3, supra p. 1016 and the table of disagreement rates in app. B,
table 4 infra.
71. CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961); FTC v. Traveler's Health
Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
72. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
73. 365 U.S. 1 (1961). See also Justice Clark's votes in H.K. Porter v. Central
Vt. Rwy., 366 U.S. 272 (1961); Sun Oil v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960); FTC v. Traveler's
Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
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were gaps in the congressional scheme of regulation, "Congress
desired regulation by federal authority rather than non-
regulation." 4
Justice Clark and the liberal bloc generally gave broad
effect to regulatory statutes. 5 In Miller Music Corp. v.
Daniels,"8 a songwriter assigned his copyright renewal rights to
Miller. Before the renewal rights vested in Miller, the song-
writer died leaving no widow or child. Clark joined the major-
ity, holding that, under the copyright laws, the renewal passed
to the executor of the songwriter's estate rather than to Miller
as assignee. The copyright statute did not explicitly provide for
a resolution of this conflict. The assignment would have clearly
been invalid if a widow had survived, and so, since the statu-
tory scheme for the passing of renewal rights put executors next
in line behind widows and children, the Court reasoned that
Congress intended the class of people including next of kin and
executors to take the rights ahead of the assignee. The dissent
argued that since the statute was silent on the matter, the
Court should give effect to the business dealings of the individ-
uals.
Another case in which Justice Clark, along with the major-
ity, advocated a broad reading of a federal regulatory statute
is FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.7 This time, unlike the
previous cases, the majority was made up of Conservatives.
Justices Warren, Black and Douglas argued in dissent that the
Federal Power Act did not authorize the taking of land, pro-
tected for over 150 years by a congressionally recognized treaty
with the Tuscarora Indian Nation, for energy purposes. The
minority asserted that this was a breach of faith and contrary
to national policy, whereas the majority, including Justice
Clark, found that federal eminent domain powers gave the Fed-
eral Power Commission broad authority.
Finally, in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company,18 Justices Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan and
Stewart argued in favor of a narrow construction of SEC regu-
lations to hold that variable annuities would not be construed
74. 365 U.S. at 28.
75. See Justice Clark's votes in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S.
482 (1960); United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960); United States v. A.P. Truck-
ing, 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
76. 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
77. 362 U.S. 499 (1960).
78. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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as insurance contracts so as to obtain exemption from SEC
regulations. The dissenters, including Clark, argued for a
broader reading of SEC regulations so as to exempt the annui-
ties and allow the states to regulate them.
Justice Clark's support for federal regulation of business
exhibited a trace of economic liberalism that contrasted with
his reluctance to extend government control in the labor area.
This support, however, was more in line with his basically pro-
government approach to subversion and criminal issues.
Taxation
Unlike Justice Stewart's position in the tax cases, Justice
Clark strongly supported the government's power to tax and
raise revenues to support its programs. Clark was the leading
advocate of the government's position in a rather cohesive bloc
that included Justices Warren, Black, Frankfurter and Bren-
nan.
7 9
Justice Clark's general support for the government's posi-
tion in the tax questions is well-illustrated by United States v.
Kaiser.'" By a six-three margin, the Court gave effect to a jury
determination that a labor union's strike assistance to a non-
member was a gift and therefore excludable from the non-
member's gross income. Justices Frankfurter and Clark con-
curred in the result, agreeing that the jury determination of the
issue was controlling, although they were careful to point out
that strike benefits were not outside the statutory concept of
gross income. The Justices thereby reinforced the strength of
the government's position in tax matters even though they ren-
dered a decision favorable to the taxpayer.
Justice Clark repeatedly refused to allow a taxpayer to use
formalistic interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code to ob-
tain favorable treatment. Rather, Clark broadly construed the
scope of taxable income and narrowly construed the scope of
deductions.8 ' For example, in Massey Motors, Inc. v. United
States,"2 Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion which held
79. See Table 4 infra and the table of disagreement rates in app. B, table 5, infra.
80. 363 U.S. 299 (1960). See also Justice Clark's votes in United States v. Bros-
nan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); United States v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 363
U.S. 194 (1960); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
81. See Justice Clark's votes in Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, 364
U.S. 130 (1960); United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76 (1960);
Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
82. 364 U.S. 92 (1960).
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that a taxpayer must use the resale value of an asset and not
its junk value to determine the amount of depreciation that
could legally be deducted. The taxpayer bought the item for
$1,650 and claimed $515 depreciation by using the asset's junk
value to determine the depreciation base. The majority would
not countenance the taxpayer's plan even though he had
strictly conformed with the statutory requirement and even
though the Commissioner had previously acquiesced in similar
actions.
Another example of Clark's pro-Internal Revenue Service
stance is his majority opinion in American Automobile Asso-
ciation v. United States.83 That case held that membership
dues, prepaid to the Association, must be included in the or-
ganization's gross income in the year in which the dues were
collected despite the fact that only a portion of the dues were
earned during the tax year in question. The majority was not
concerned that the accounting method employed by the tax-
payer matched receipt of income with the provision of the tax-
payer's services to its members. The taxpayer's system, in ef-
fect, allowed it to delay the reporting of income and thereby
postpone tax liability. Justice Stewart's dissent argued that the
IRC allowed the use of any regularly employed accounting sys-
tem. Nevertheless, the majority (per Clark) gave broad effect
to statutorily defined gross income as including all dues col-
lected by the taxpayer in the tax year.
In summary, Justice Clark joined Justices Warren, Black,
Frankfurter and Brennan in favoring a broad federal taxing
power. The voting patterns in the tax cases depart significantly
from the bloc voting norm of the period; Justices Clark and
Frankfurter joined three of the liberals to form a cohesive
group. Clark's support for a strong federal taxing authority
conformed to his pro-government position in the business regu-
lation area, again evincing a streak of liberalism.
JUSTICES STEWART AND CLARK AS SWING VOTES
During the 1958, 1959, and 1960 Terms, the Supreme
Court often found itself polarized into two voting blocs. Jus-
tices Warren, Black, Douglas and Brennan often voted to-
gether, opposing Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker.
Justices Stewart and Clark were not so systematically placed
83. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
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on one side or the other. Their moderate positions, when ana-
lyzed in the various substantive categories of cases, demon-
strate the extent to which they were actually "swing votes."
The subversion cases were the most divisive cases sur-
veyed. Fifteen of the twenty-five decisions saw the liberal bloc
entrenched against the conservative bloc. Justice Clark clearly
joined the conservatives. Justice Stewart generally did too, al-
though, he joined the liberal bloc to write two well-known opin-
ions. 84 The conservative view generally prevailed in this area
because of this support.85
In the criminal area, bloc voting was again prevalent. The
liberal group fared a bit better, prevailing in six of the fourteen
cases. Justice Clark again was in the conservative camp, this
time as its leader. Thus, Justice Stewart was directly responsi-
ble for the liberals' better fortunes by providing the fifth vote
necessary to muster a majority. There were clear limits to Jus-
tice Stewart's liberal leanings, however.8 1
In the labor cases, there was little diametrically opposed
bloc voting. The liberal bloc was cohesive in its pro-union sup-
port. Justices Frankfurter, Clark and Stewart, however, by
evenly splitting their pro- and anti-union votes, gave the
liberals the extra margin necessary to assure a pro-union out-
come in most cases.87
In the business regulation cases, a high frequency of bloc
voting was observed. Justice Clark usually voted with the liber-
als. Justice Stewart voted with the liberals also, but much less
frequently. 8 This alignment of the Justices, particularly the
movement of Clark and Stewart, produced the liberal outcome
in closer cases.88
The tax cases saw a strikingly different alignment of Jus-
tices voting together on particular issues.'" Justices Warren,
Black, Frankfurter, Clark and Brennan generally supported
broad governmental authority to tax. Justice Stewart generally
displayed a strong willingness to support the taxpayer's
84. Deutsch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
47 (1960).
85. See disagreement rate table for subversion cases in app. B, table 1 infra.
86. See disagreement rate tables for criminal cases in app. B, table 2 infra.
87. See disagreement rate table for labor cases in app. B, table 3 infra.
88. See note 80 supra.
89. See disagreement rate table for business regulation cases in app. B, table 4
infra.
90. See Table 4 supra.
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claim,9' but no cohesive bloc supported his view.
Justices Clark and Stewart were swing votes in the subver-
sion, criminal, business regulation and, to a lesser extent, the
labor cases. Because Justice Stewart was the swing vote in the
highly publicized civil liberties cases, it is not surprising that
contemporary observers believed that "as Stewart goes, so goes
the Court.""2
Professor Galloway asserts that Justice Clark was in fact
the true swing vote.'3 Support for this view is found in the large
number of economically cast cases in which Clark's position on
the issues is very close to that of the liberals. Justice Clark
usually provided the liberals with the necessary fifth vote.
Thus, Clark's voting in the economic area balanced his gener-
ally conservative voting in the civil liberties cases. Justice
Stewart, on the other hand, was closely aligned with the con-
servative bloc in subversion, criminal and business regulation
cases. He rather consistently voted as a conservative albeit as
the closest conservative vote to the moderate position. " On
balance, then, Professor Galloway's thesis is correct. 5
CONCLUSION
A somewhat complex portrait of Justice Clark emerges
from the foregoing analysis. He favored a large measure of gov-
ernmental control in the subversion, criminal, business regula-
tion and tax areas while showing ambivalence in the labor
cases. In the subversion and criminal cases, Justice Clark iden-
tified closely with the conservative bloc. But in the economic
cases, he was usually aligned with the liberals. While it does
not seem possible to identify an overall jurisprudential philoso-
phy for Justice Clark, a common thread of support for govern-
mental control and regulation runs through his opinions.
It is also difficult to summarize briefly Justice Stewart's
views. He strongly identified with the conservatives in subver-
sion, criminal and business regulation cases. But he was defi-
91. See pp. 22-23 infra.
92. See Israel, Potter Stewart, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969, at 2925 (L. Friedman and F. Israel eds. 1969).
93. Galloway, The Second Period of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend
Abates (1957-1961), 19 SANTA CLARA L. Rlv. 947 (1979).
94. Id. at 964.
95. These findings correspond with the statistical presentation of Harold J.
Spaeth, Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The "B" Scale, in JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING 89 (Schubert ed. 1963).
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nitely more a centrist on these issues than any conservative
Justice. Justice Stewart generally favored the government's
position in civil liberties cases, but only when procedural safe-
guards were observed. In the economic areas, Stewart favored
limited regulation of business practices.
It is not surprising that the two Justices occupying the
Court's middle ground had no clearly defined legal philosophy.
While each Justice had definite views on particular issues, nei-
ther voted these views to the exclusion of all others: the Court
during the period studied points up the importance of under-
standing the role of the swing vote.
Steven Smith
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
SUBVERSION CASES (25)
Anastopolo v. United States,
366 U.S. 82 (1961)
Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959)
Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 (1961)
Communist Party v. Catherwood,
367 U.S. 389 (1961)
Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board,
367 U.S. 1 (1961)
Deutch v. United States,
367 U.S. 456 (1961)
Flaxer v. United States,
358 U.S. 147 (1958)
Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603 (1960)
Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474 (1959)
Kimm v. Rosenberg,
363 U.S. 405 (1960)
Konigsberg v. United States,
366 U.S. 90 (1960)
McPhaul v. United States,
364 U.S. 372 (1960)
Nelson v. Los Angeles,
362 U.S. 1 (1960)
Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290 (1961)
Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343 (1959)
Polites v. United States,
364 U.S. 426 (1960)
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959)
Rosenberg v. United States,
360 U.S. 367 (1959)
Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961)
Scull v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
359 U.S. 344 (1959)
Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960)
Slagle v. Ohio, 366 U.S. 259 (1961)
Uphaus v. Wyman,
360 U.S. 72 (1959)
Vitarelli v. Seaton,
359 U.S. 535 (1959)
Wilkinson v. United States,
365 U.S. 399 (1961)
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TABLE 2
CRIMINAL CASES (60)
Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187 (1959)
Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960)
Anonymous v. Baker,
360 U.S. 287 (1959)
Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121 (1959)
Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199 (1960)
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
Callanan v. United States,
364 U.S. 587 (1961)
Campbell v. United States,
365 U.S. 85 (1961)
Carbo v. United States,
364 U.S. 611 (1961)
Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959)
Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961)
Clancy v. United States,
365 U.S. 312 (1961)
Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961)
Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959)
Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960)
Ferguson v. Georgia,
365 U.S. 570 (1961)
Forman v. United States,
361 U.S. 416 (1960)
Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959)
Gori v. United States,
367 U.S. 364 (1961)
Green v. United States,
365 U.S. 301 (1961)
Harris v. United States,
359 U.S. 19 (1959)
Heflin v. United States,
358 U.S. 415 (1959)
Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959)
Hudson v. North Carolina,
363 U.S. 697 (1960)
Ingram v. United States,
360 U.S. 672 (1959)
Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959)
Irwin v. Dowd, 360 U.S. 717 (1961)
Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960)
Ladner v. United States,
358 U.S. 169 (1958)
Levine v. United States,
362 U.S. 610 (1960)
Lott v. United States,
367 U.S. 421 (1961)
Lurk v. United States,
366 U.S. 712 (1961)
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
McNeal v. Culver,
365 U.S. 109 (1961)
Milanovich v. United States,
365 U.S. 551 (1961)
Mills v. Louisiana,
360 U.S. 230 (1959)
Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959)
New York v. O'Neill,
359 U.S. 1 (1959)
Ohio v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960)
Parr v. United States,
363 U.S. 370 (1960)
Piemonte v. United States,
367 U.S. 556 (1961)
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959)
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961)
Reina v. United States,
364 U.S. 507 (1960)
Reynolds v. Cochran,
365 U.S. 525 (1961)
Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961)
Schaffer v. United States,
362 U.S. 511 (1960)
Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961)
Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961)
Smith v. United States,
360 U.S. 1 (1959)
Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959)
Stewart v. United States,
366 U.S. 1 (1961)
Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212 (1960)
Thompson v. Louisville,
362 U.S. 199 (1960)
United States v. Dege,
364 U.S. 51 (1960)
United States v. Robinson,
361 U.S. 220 (1960)
United States v. Shirey,
359 U.S. 255 (1959)
Williams v. State,
358 U.S. 576 (1959)
Wilson v. Schnettler,
365 U.S. 381 (1961)
Wyatt v. United States,
362 U.S. 525 (1960)
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TABLE 3
LABOR CASES (35)
Arnold v. Kanowsky,
361 U.S. 388 (1960)
Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.,
363 U.S. 528 (1960)
DeVeau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144 (1960)
Felter v. So. Pacific Co.,
359 U.S. 326 (1959)
Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961)
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740 (1961)
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver,
358 U.S. 283 (1959)
Int'l Typographical Union v. NLRB,
365 U.S. 705 (1961)
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.,
361 U.S. 459 (1960)
Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters
v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961)
Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961)
Local 761, Int'l Union of Electrical,
Radio v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961)
Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB,
362 U.S. 411 (1960)
Local No. 8-6, Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers v. Missouri,
361 U.S. 363 (1960)
Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama
Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365 (1960)
Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. 288 (1960)
Mitchell v. Lublin,
358 U.S. 207 (1959)
Mitchell v. Zackry,
362 U.S. 310 (1960)
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,
360 U.S. 203 (1959)
NLRB v. Deena Artware,
361 U.S. 398 (1960)
NLRB v. Drivers Local Union,
362 U.S. 274 (1960)
NLRB v. Fant Milling Co.,
360 U.S. 301 (1959)
NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union,
361 U.S. 477 (1960)
NLRB v. Radio & Television
Broadcast Engineers,
364 U.S. 573 (1961)
NLRB v. News Syndicate Co.,
365 U.S. 695 (1961)
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N.W.R.R.,
362 U.S. 330 (1960)
Penn. R.R. v. Day
360 U.S. 548 (1959)
Plumbers, Steamfitters, etc. v. County
of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959)
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
System Federation v. Wright,
364 U.S. 642 (1961)
United States v. Embassy Restuarant,
359 U.S. 29 (1959)
United Steel Workers v. Warrior
Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960)
United Steelworkers of America v.
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
Union Pacific R.R. v. Price,
360 U.S. 601 (1959)
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TABLE 4
BUSINESS REGULATION CASES (46)
Am. Trucking Ass'n v. United States,
364 U.S. 1 (1960)
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Replacement Co.,
365 U.S. 336 (1961)
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public
Service Commission,
360 U.S. 378 (1959)
Bhd. of Maintenance of Way
Employees v. United States,
366 U.S. 169 (1961)
Boynton v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)
CAB v. Delta Air Lines,
367 U.S. 316 (1961)
Chicago, M., St.P. & P.R.R. v. United
States, 366 U.S. 745 (1961)
Eastern R.R. Presidents v. Noerr,
365 U.S. 127 (1961)
Farmer's Educational & Coop. Union
v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959)
FHA v. Darlington,
358 U.S. 84 (1958)
Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch.,
358 U.S. 153 (1958)
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961)
FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
362 U.S. 99 (1960)
FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S.
536 (1960)
FTC v. Broch, 363 U.S. 166 (1960)
FTC v. Mandel Bros.,
359 U.S. 385 (1959)
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
360 U.S. 55 (1959)
FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n,
362 U.S. 293 (1960)
Int'l Boxing Club of America v.
United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959)
Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959)
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
359 U.S. 207 (1959)
Lewis v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank
of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603 (1961)
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
v. United States,
362 U.S. 458 (1960)
Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United
States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959)
Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels,
362 U.S. 373 (1960)
Pan American Petroleum Co. v.
Superior Court of Delaware,
366 U.S. 656 (1961)
Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States,
363 U.S. 202 (1960)
H. K. Porter Co. v. Central Vermont
Ry., 366 U.S. 272 (1961)
Power Reactor Development Co. v.
Int'l Union, 367 U.S. 396 (1961)
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Retail Growers Ass'n,
360 U.S. 334 (1959)
SBA v. McClellan,
364 U.S. 446 (1960)
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
Sunray Oil Co. v. FPC,
364 U.S. 137, (1960)
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961)
Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960)
T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464 (1959)
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water,
358 U.S. 103 (1958)
United States v. A & P Trucking,
358 U.S. 121 (1958)
United States v. Atlantic Refining
Co, 360 U.S. 19 (1959)
United States v. E. I. DuPont,
366 U.S. 316 (1961)
United States v. Mersky,
361 U.S. 431 (1960)
United States v. Mississippi Valley
Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961)
United States v. Parke-Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960)
United States v. Radio Corp. of
America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959)
United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
362 U.S. 482 (1960)
United States v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R, 361 US. 78 (1959)
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TABLE 5
TAX CASES (27)
Alaska v. Am. Can Co.,
358 U.S. 224 (1959)
Am. Auto Ass'n v. United States,
367 U.S. 687 (1961)
Aquilino v. United States,
363 U.S. 509 (1960)
Bulova Watch Co. v. United States,
365 U.S. 753 (1961)
Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498 (1959)
Commissioner v. Acker,
361 U.S. 87 (1959)
Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278 (1960)
Commissioner v. Gillette Motor,
364 U.S. 130 (1960)
Commissioner v. Hansen,
360 U.S. 446 (1959)
Commissioner v. Lester,
366 U.S. 299 (1961)
Flora v. United States,
362 U.S. 145 (1960)
Hertz v. United States,
364 U.S. 122 (1960)
James v United States,
366 U.S. 213 (1961)
Jarecki v. Searle,
367 U.S. 303 (1961)
Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960)
Massey Motors, Inc., v. United States,
364 U.S. 92 (1960)
Meyer v. United States,
364 U.S. 410 (1960)
Parsons v Smith,
359 U.S. 215 (1959)
Peurifoy v. Commissioner,
358 U.S. 59 (1958)
Sims v. United States,
359 U.S. 108 (1959)
United States v. Brosnan,
363 U.S. 237 (1960)
United States v. Cannelton Sewer
Pipe Co., 364 U.S 76 (1960)
United States v Consolidated Edison
Co., 366 U.S. 380 (1961)
United States v. Durham Lumber Co.,
363 U.S. 522 (1960)
United States v. Kaiser,
363 U.S. 299 (1960)
United States v. Manufacturer's Nat'l
Bank of Detroit,
363 U.S. 237 (1960)
United States v. Price,
361 U.S. 304 (1960)
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
DISAGREEMENT RATES* - SUBVERSION CASES
0 -CS CCcc
%- - - 56.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 72.0
Douglas
# 0/24 0/25 0/25 14/25 17/25 17/25 17/25 18/25
% - - 58.3 73.9 70.8 70.8 75.0
Warren
# 0/24 0/24 14/24 17/23 17/24 17/24 18/24
% - 56.0 70.8 68.0 68.0 72.0
Black
# 0/24 14/25 17/24 17/25 17/25 18/25
0 56.0 70.8 68.0 68.0 72.0
Brennan
# 14/25 17/24 17/25 17/25 18/25
0 12.5 12.0 12.0 16.0
Stewart
# 3/24 3/25 3/25 4/25
- - 4.1
Frankfurter
# 0/24 0/24 1/24
% - 4.0
Whittaker
# 0/25 1/25
% 4.0
Harlan
# 1/25
Clark
* Number of disagreements
Number of cases in which both judges participated
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TABLE 2
DISAGREEMENT RATES - CRIMINAL CASES
ra
C 15.0 16.9 18.3 21.0 58.3 60.0 55.0 61.6
Douglas
# 9/60 10/59 11/60 12/57 35/60 36/60 33/60 37/60
10.0 23.3 43.8 50.0 58.3 56.6 63.3
Black
# 6/60 14/60 25/57 30/60 35/60 34/60 38/60
0 15.2 42.8 48.3 58.3 51.6 55.0
Warren
# 9/59 24/56 29/60 35/60 31/60 33/60
0 29.8 36.6 43.3 37.2 43.3
Brennan
# 17/57 22/60 26/60 22/59 26/60
0 26.3 19.2 19.6 28.0
Stewart
# 15/57 11/57 11/56 16/57
I 16.6 18.6 16.6
Whittaker
# 10/60 11/59 10/60
% 6.7 20.0
Harlan
# 4/59 12/60
% 18.6
Frankfurter
# 11/59
Clark
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TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATES- LABOR CASES
r~
% 12.5 17.6 28.1 26.4 41.3 31.4 40.6 64.7
Douglas
# 4/32 6/34 11/35 9/34 12/29 15/34 13/32 22/34
% 6.6 29.0 35.7 51.8 40.6 46.6 65.6
Black
# 2/30 9/31 10/28 14/27 13/32 14/30 21/32
% 14.7 21.2 50.0 35.4 31.2 55.8
Warren
# 5/34 7/33 15/30 11/31 10/32 19/34
% 14.7 30.0 22.8 21.8 48.5
Brennan
# 5/34 9/30 8/35 7/32 17/35
% 27.5 20.5 12.9 41.1
Harlan
# 8/29 7/34 4/31 14/34
% 26.6 21.4 25.8
Frankfurter
# 8/30 6/28 8/31
% 21.8 25.7
Clark
# 7/32 9/35
25.0
Stewart
# 8/32
Whittaker
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TABLE 4
DISAGREEMENT RATES - BUSINESS REGULATION CASES
m 0-cBd B
% 6.6 17.7 24.4
Douglas
# 3/45 8/45 11/45
% 8.6 17.3
Black
# 4/46 8/46
26.2 47.4 53.7 58.1 56.8
11/42 21/44 24/45 25/43 25/44
20.9 40.0 45.6 52.2 48.8
9/43 18/45 21/46 23/44 22/45
% 6.5 9.3 28.8 39.1 40.9 44.4
Warren
# 3/46 4/43 13/45 18/46 18/44 20/45
% 6.9 22.2 32.6 34.0 35.6
Brennan
# 3/43 10/45 15/46 15/44 16/45
0 30.9 32.5 38.0 40.4
Clark
# 13/42 14/43 16/42 17/42
25.0 16.2 18.6
Stewart
# 11/44 7/43 8/43
% 13.3 8.8
Whittaker
# 6/45 4/45
% 6.8
Harlan
# 3/44
Frankfurter
19791 1037
1038 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
APPENDIX B
TABLE 5
DISAGREEMENT RATES - TAX CASES
7.4 11.1 23.0 26.9 42.3 37.0 48.1 55.5
Brennan
# 2/27 3/27 6/26 7/26 11/26 10/27 13/27 15/27
C 11.1 15.3 19.2 42.3 33.3 40.7 51.8
Warren
# 3/27 4/26 5/26 11/26 9/27 11/27 14/27
% 26.9 15.3 38.4 44.4 51.8 55.5
Clark
# 7/27 4/26 10/26 12/27 14/27 15/27
C 36.0 44.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Black
# 9/25 11/25 13/26 13/26 13/26
% 29.6 38.4 46.1 73.0
Frankfurter
# 8/27 10/26 12/26 19/26
% 34.6 38.4 65.3
Harlan
# 9/26 10/26 17/26
0 14.8 51.8
Stewart
# 4/27 14/27
%/ 40.7
Whittaker
# 11/27
Douglas
